A Joplin child molester whose first appeal was rejected by the Missouri Southern District Court of Appeals, did better the second time, but it's not quite what he wanted.
Robert William Shields wanted Jasper County Circuit Court Judge Dean Dankelson removed from his case after Dankelson didn't allow him to change lawyers during his resentencing hearing
The appeals court rejected that idea, but agreed that Dankelson's written sentence of 99 years for first degree statutory sodomy needed to be tossed in favor of the life sentence he gave from the bench.
Shields was also sentenced to 15 years for child molestation, a life sentence for statutory rape and seven years on a second statutory rape charge with the sentences to run consecutively.
The crimes were committed over a 9-year period beginning when the girl was five years old.
From the opinion:
A jury found Appellant guilty of one count of first-degree child molestation, one count of first-degree statutory sodomy, one count of first-degree statutory rape, and one count of second-degree statutory rape.Appellant was released pending sentencing.
Appellant failed to appear for his scheduled sentencing hearing after removing his electronic monitoring device and fleeing to Colorado. He absconded for more than one year before being arrested in Colorado and extradited to Missouri for sentencing. Judge Dean Dankelson presided over the sentencing hearing following Appellant’s return.
At that hearing, Appellant informed the court that he had discharged trial counsel, had filed a federal lawsuit against trial counsel, counsel’s law firm, and the Jasper County Prosecutor, and requested appointment of substitute counsel.
Appellant failed to appear for his scheduled sentencing hearing after removing his electronic monitoring device and fleeing to Colorado. He absconded for more than one year before being arrested in Colorado and extradited to Missouri for sentencing. Judge Dean Dankelson presided over the sentencing hearing following Appellant’s return.
At that hearing, Appellant informed the court that he had discharged trial counsel, had filed a federal lawsuit against trial counsel, counsel’s law firm, and the Jasper County Prosecutor, and requested appointment of substitute counsel.
During the ensuing discussion, Appellant asserted trial counsel’s ineffective assistance contributed to his decision to abscond before sentencing. Judge Dankelson rejected that assertion, stating Appellant’s decision to abscond was his own and commenting that trial counsel was “one of the finest attorneys this Court has ever seen.”
Judge Dankelson did not appoint substitute counsel and proceeded to sentence Appellant to consecutive terms of fifteen years’ imprisonment for first-degree child molestation, ninety-nine years’ imprisonment for first-degree statutory sodomy, life imprisonment for first-degree statutory rape, and seven years’ imprisonment for second-degree statutory rape.
Appellant appealed. In that appeal, this Court concluded Appellant had not waived his constitutional right to counsel at sentencing. The Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions, vacated the sentences, and remanded the case for resentencing.
Following remand, the case was again assigned to Judge Dankelson for resentencing. Appellant moved to disqualify Judge Dankelson, alleging the judge’s comments during the original sentencing hearing created an appearance of partiality and impropriety.
Appellant appealed. In that appeal, this Court concluded Appellant had not waived his constitutional right to counsel at sentencing. The Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions, vacated the sentences, and remanded the case for resentencing.
Following remand, the case was again assigned to Judge Dankelson for resentencing. Appellant moved to disqualify Judge Dankelson, alleging the judge’s comments during the original sentencing hearing created an appearance of partiality and impropriety.
Judge Dankelson requested that another judge hear the motion, and the Supreme Court of Missouri assigned Judge Stephen Carlton for that purpose. After conducting a hearing, Judge Carlton denied the motion to recuse, concluding the record did not establish grounds requiring Judge Dankelson’s disqualification.
Judge Dankelson thereafter conducted the resentencing hearing and imposed consecutive sentences of fifteen years’ imprisonment for first-degree child molestation, fifty years’ imprisonment for first-degree statutory sodomy, life imprisonment for first- degree statutory rape, and seven years’ imprisonment for second-degree statutory rape. This appeal followed.
Discussion
Appellant claims the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his motion to disqualify Judge Dankelson from presiding over the resentencing hearing. Appellant contends the comments Judge Dankelson made during the original sentencing hearing demonstrated an appearance of partiality arising from the judge’s favorable opinion of Appellant’s trial counsel. We disagree.
Judge Dankelson thereafter conducted the resentencing hearing and imposed consecutive sentences of fifteen years’ imprisonment for first-degree child molestation, fifty years’ imprisonment for first-degree statutory sodomy, life imprisonment for first- degree statutory rape, and seven years’ imprisonment for second-degree statutory rape. This appeal followed.
Discussion
Appellant claims the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his motion to disqualify Judge Dankelson from presiding over the resentencing hearing. Appellant contends the comments Judge Dankelson made during the original sentencing hearing demonstrated an appearance of partiality arising from the judge’s favorable opinion of Appellant’s trial counsel. We disagree.
We review the denial of a motion to disqualify a judge for abuse of discretion.
Burgess v. State, 342 S.W.3d 325, 328 (Mo. banc 2011).
trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice. Prince v. State, 390 S.W.3d 225, 230 (Mo.App. 2013). A judge is presumed to act impartially, and the party seeking disqualification bears the burden of overcoming that presumption. Rule 2-2.11(A) requires recusal when a judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned,” including when the judge possesses a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.1 But “[a] disqualifying bias or prejudice must be one emanating from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from participation in the case.” Burgess, 342 S.W.3d at 328.
Appellant argues Judge Dankelson’s statement that trial counsel was “one of the finest attorneys this Court has ever seen” demonstrates an extrajudicial bias requiring recusal. The argument depends upon the premise that the judge’s favorable opinion of counsel necessarily reflected a personal relationship that impaired the judge’s impartiality toward Appellant.
Appellant argues Judge Dankelson’s statement that trial counsel was “one of the finest attorneys this Court has ever seen” demonstrates an extrajudicial bias requiring recusal. The argument depends upon the premise that the judge’s favorable opinion of counsel necessarily reflected a personal relationship that impaired the judge’s impartiality toward Appellant.
The record, however, does not support that inference.
The challenged remark occurred only after Appellant asserted that trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness caused him to abscond before his original sentencing hearing and further criticized counsel’s physical condition during trial. Judge Dankelson rejected those assertions, reminding Appellant that the decision to flee Missouri was his own and responding to Appellant’s criticism of counsel by expressing his opinion of counsel’s professional abilities.
The challenged remark occurred only after Appellant asserted that trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness caused him to abscond before his original sentencing hearing and further criticized counsel’s physical condition during trial. Judge Dankelson rejected those assertions, reminding Appellant that the decision to flee Missouri was his own and responding to Appellant’s criticism of counsel by expressing his opinion of counsel’s professional abilities.
Nothing in the record suggests the judge relied upon information obtained outside the judicial proceedings or possessed personal knowledge of disputed facts.
Rather, the comments arose directly from the sentencing colloquy and the issues Appellant himself injected into the proceeding.
Judge Dankelson’s favorable assessment of trial counsel’s professional abilities does not establish the type of personal bias contemplated by Rule 2-2.11. Nothing in this record suggests the remark reflected anything other than the judge’s assessment of counsel’s professional performance.
Judge Dankelson’s favorable assessment of trial counsel’s professional abilities does not establish the type of personal bias contemplated by Rule 2-2.11. Nothing in this record suggests the remark reflected anything other than the judge’s assessment of counsel’s professional performance.
Standing alone, the remark does not demonstrate personal bias against Appellant or an extrajudicial source of prejudice.
The procedural history of this case further undermines Appellant’s claim.
Following remand, Judge Dankelson did not rule upon his own impartiality. Instead, he requested that another judge hear the motion to disqualify. The Supreme Court assigned Judge Carlton to determine the motion, and after considering the parties’ evidence and arguments, Judge Carlton denied the request for recusal.
Although that ruling is itself the basis of Appellant’s argument, the procedure employed demonstrates
that Appellant’s allegations received independent judicial consideration before resentencing occurred.
Appellant points to remarks made during the course of the judicial proceedings in response to his own accusations against trial counsel. Even accepting Appellant’s characterization of the record, the legal standard for mandatory recusal was not met.
that Appellant’s allegations received independent judicial consideration before resentencing occurred.
Appellant points to remarks made during the course of the judicial proceedings in response to his own accusations against trial counsel. Even accepting Appellant’s characterization of the record, the legal standard for mandatory recusal was not met.
At most, those remarks may reflect disagreement with Appellant’s characterization of counsel or frustration with Appellant’s attempt to attribute his flight from Missouri to counsel’s representation. They do not, however, establish a personal bias arising from an extrajudicial source or otherwise demonstrate that Judge Dankelson’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
Because Appellant failed to overcome the presumption of judicial impartiality, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to disqualify. Appellant’s point is denied.
As a final matter, we note the written judgment reflects a sentence of 99 years for first-degree statutory rape, but the oral pronouncement of the judgment at sentencing was life in prison. “The written sentence and judgment of the trial court should reflect the oral pronouncement of sentence.” State v. Turner, 609 S.W.3d 92, 101 (Mo.App. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“If the written judgment and oral pronouncement materially differ, the oral pronouncement controls.” State v. Bittick, 727 S.W.3d 166, 173 (Mo.App. 2025). “Sentences of life and 99 years are materially different because, among other things, they have a different effect in determining parole eligibility dates.” State v. Pardee, 700 S.W.3d 42, 54 (Mo.App. 2024). “Errors of this nature are ‘clerical’ and may be corrected nunc pro tunc.
Accordingly, we remand this case to the circuit court for entry of a written judgment which corrects the clerical error and conforms to the oral pronouncement of the sentences. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
