Settlement reached in lawsuit against Mac County deputy who broke woman's leg over dog complaint

A settlement was finalized in February in a lawsuit filed by a McDonald County couple who claimed a McDonald County deputy broke the woman's leg while responding to a complain that the couple's dogs were killing the neighbor's chickens.

Defendants in the lawsuit were the deputy, Travis Sheppard, Sheriff Robert Evenson, EMT Roy Rivard and the Freeman-Oak Hill Health System.

No details of the settlement were revealed in court documents.

The six-count lawsuit alleged two Fourth Amendment violations, one for Sheppard's alleged use of excessive force against Jenna Bankston and two against Evenson for allegedly approving of Sheppard's actions and for not properly training him.

Bankston's husband, Randy Bankston, sued for loss of consortium and Jenna Bankston sued Freeman/Oak Hill and Rivard for negligent medical care.

The allegations were spelled out in the petition:

On February 23, 2021, Defendant Travis Sheppard was employed as a deputy by McDonald County Sheriff’s Department. On February 23, 2021, Defendant Sheppard responded to a call regarding an animal complaint shortly after 8am.

Upon arrival, Defendant Sheppard met with two complaining citizens who wished to file a complaint against Plaintiff regarding Plaintiff allowing her dogs to “run loose,” allegedly resulting in her dogs killing the complainants’ chickens.

Defendant Sheppard requests the citizens fill out written statements and confirms that they wish to “press charges.” It is clear from his statements to complainants that Defendant Sheppard believes allowing an animal to get loose and cause property damage is a criminal offense.

Ultimately, Defendant Sheppard writes Plaintiff a ticket for violation of R.S.Mo. § 578.012. No part of R.S.Mo. § 578.012, as it was in effect on the date of Plaintiff’s arrest, could possibly be read as criminalizing the alleged behavior of Plaintiff. Presumably, Defendant Sheppard was thinking of a much older version of R.S.Mo. § 578.012, in effect until 2013, which contained language that arguably made such conduct a misdemeanor.
However, the language that arguably criminalized such conduct was removed from the statute by the Missouri Legislature over seven (7) years before February 23, 2021. Any reasonable officer would be aware of changes to laws regarding what is legal and what is illegal within five years.




The allegations are spelled out in the petition:

On February 23, 2021, Defendant Travis Sheppard was employed as a deputy by McDonald County Sheriff’s Department. On February 23, 2021, Defendant Sheppard responded to a call regarding an animal complaint shortly after 8am.

Upon arrival, Defendant Sheppard met with two complaining citizens who wished to file a complaint against Plaintiff regarding Plaintiff allowing her dogs to “run loose,” allegedly resulting in her dogs killing the complainants’ chickens.

Defendant Sheppard requests the citizens fill out written statements and confirms that they wish to “press charges.” It is clear from his statements to complainants that Defendant Sheppard believes allowing an animal to get loose and cause property damage is a criminal offense.

Ultimately, Defendant Sheppard writes Plaintiff a ticket for violation of R.S.Mo. § 578.012. No part of R.S.Mo. § 578.012, as it was in effect on the date of Plaintiff’s arrest, could possibly be read as criminalizing the alleged behavior of Plaintiff. Presumably, Defendant Sheppard was thinking of a much older version of R.S.Mo. § 578.012, in effect until 2013, which contained language that arguably made such conduct a misdemeanor.
However, the language that arguably criminalized such conduct was removed from the statute by the Missouri Legislature over seven (7) years before February 23, 2021. Any reasonable officer would be aware of changes to laws regarding what is legal and what is illegal within five years.

Defendant Sheppard then proceeds to Plaintiff’s home with the intention of giving her a criminal citation because her dogs allegedly got out and killed the neighbors’ chickens. Prior to encountering Plaintiff, Defendant Sheppard had not found, observed, looked for, inquired about, or shown any interest in finding physical evidence (or any other evidence) that might support or refute the complainants’ accusations.

Prior to encountering Plaintiff, Defendant had no information whatsoever as to the circumstances by which Plaintiff’s dogs may have “gotten loose” and had not attempted to locate or develop any evidence that Plaintiff had failed to control her animals “knowingly.”

In other words, even had the 2013 version of the statute still been in effect, Defendant Sheppard failed to develop, or even attempt to develop, probable cause that the elements of that offense had been met by Plaintiff’s alleged actions and/or inactions.

When Defendant Sheppard arrives at Plaintiff’s residence and knocks on the door, Plaintiff Jenna Bankston partially leans out of her doorway to ask what the Defendant needs. Defendant informs her that he is investigating some white dogs killing chickens and that he needs Plaintiff’s identification.

Plaintiff begins by stating that the neighbors don’t know her dogs have killed any of their chickens. Rather than engage in discussion or hear Plaintiff’s side of the story, Defendant Sheppard demands that she produce her “ID” so that he can give her a citation.

Defendant Sheppard then proceeds to Plaintiff’s home with the intention of giving her a criminal citation because her dogs allegedly got out and killed the neighbors’ chickens. Prior to encountering Plaintiff, Defendant Sheppard had not found, observed, looked for, inquired about, or shown any interest in finding physical evidence (or any other evidence) that might support or refute the complainants’ accusations.

Prior to encountering Plaintiff, Defendant had no information whatsoever as to the circumstances by which Plaintiff’s dogs may have “gotten loose” and had not attempted to locate or develop any evidence that Plaintiff had failed to control her animals “knowingly.”

In other words, even had the 2013 version of the statute still been in effect, Defendant Sheppard failed to develop, or even attempt to develop, probable cause that the elements of that offense had been met by Plaintiff’s alleged actions and/or inactions.

When Defendant Sheppard arrives at Plaintiff’s residence and knocks on the door, Plaintiff Jenna Bankston partially leans out of her doorway to ask what the Defendant needs. Defendant informs her that he is investigating some white dogs killing chickens and that he needs Plaintiff’s identification.

Plaintiff begins by stating that the neighbors don’t know her dogs have killed any of their chickens. Rather than engage in discussion or hear Plaintiff’s side of the story, Defendant Sheppard demands that she produce her “ID” so that he can give her a citation.

Again, at this time Defendant still has developed no evidence whatsoever about how the dogs may have gotten loose and/or Plaintiff’s knowledge regarding it, which are required elements of the crime he believed he was issuing a citation for.

Plaintiff responds, “For what? I didn’t do nothing wrong.”

As Defendant Sheppard demands to get her “ID”; Plaintiff states that she doesn’t need a citation and takes a further step out of the doorway as she tries to explain the situation with the neighbors. Defendant Sheppard then begins rapidly approaching Plaintiff and states that, in that case, he will take her to jail.

There are no legal grounds in Missouri to arrest or detain a citizen in his or her own doorway for failing to produce “ID” to an officer who knocked on the door. There are no legal grounds in Missouri to arrest or detain a citizen for stating that the citizen didn’t do anything wrong or that the citizen doesn’t need a criminal citation, even if an officer disagrees with those statements.

Both at the time Defendant Sheppard informed Plaintiff that he intended to give her a citation and at the time he physically arrests her, Defendant Sheppard lacked any facts that would support a conclusion that any criminal activity had occurred, was occurring, or was about to occur.

Once Defendant Sheppard starts to move quickly toward Plaintiff and informs her that she is going to jail, Plaintiff states she doesn’t need to go to jail and begins to lean back inside her home. Defendant Sheppard quickly rushes Plaintiff and bursts through the doorway to arrest Plaintiff.

Defendant then drags Plaintiff out of her doorway and down several wooden steps, telling her “First off, you’re not going to resist me.” After dragging her down the stairs and forcing her back to a standing position, Defendant Sheppard forces Plaintiff’s hands behind her back and begins to handcuff her.

After Plaintiff is placed in the first handcuff, she experiences pain in her shoulder, related to an old injury, as Defendant Sheppard attempts to place her second hand into the handcuffs. As a result of the pain, Plaintiff leans forward to alter the angle of her shoulder to try to relieve the pain. At no time does Plaintiff break away from Defendant Sheppard’s grasp.

Defendant Sheppard calmly states “Oh! You want to try and break away from me, eh?” Defendant Sheppard proceeds to jerk Plaintiff’s body backward as he performs a “leg sweep” to take her to the ground.

At no point was Defendant Sheppard in danger of losing control of Plaintiff. Nothing in the McDonald’s County Sheriff Department Policy Manual indicates when a “leg sweep” of an arrestee may be warranted, nor what risks such use of force pose to the citizen being arrested. McDonald’s County Sheriff Department Policy Manual does indicate that its officers should only use pain compliance techniques that they have been trained and certified to use by the department.

At no point was Plaintiff placing Defendant Sheppard in apprehension of any harm or injury. At no point was Plaintiff a threat to escape or a threat of harm to anyone.

Plaintiff immediately begins screaming in pain after Defendant Sheppard “sweeps” her leg. Plaintiff repeatedly tells Defendant that he has broken her knee and that her knee hurts so much that it must be broken.

Defendant Sheppard orders her to “stand up!” and refuses to acknowledge the possibility that Plaintiff is telling the truth and is injured. Defendant Sheppard forces Plaintiff to walk approximately fifty (50) yards with a comminuted fracture of her tibial plateau. Plaintiff screams in pain and begs to be helped or, at least, not forced to walk continually.

Plaintiff tells Defendant Sheppard that she can’t stand because her knee is so painful, Defendant Sheppard replies to her: “yeah and my back’s hurting. Come on. Be a big girl. There ya go…”

Throughout the arrest, Defendant repeatedly states to Plaintiff that “all you had to do was provide me your ID.” Plaintiff repeatedly tells Defendant that she can’t get into his SUV because of the pain in her knee. Defendant tells Plaintiff, “Yes you can; and you will.”

As additional units arrive, Defendant Sheppard claims that Plaintiff “sure as hell wanted to fight real good,” although Plaintiff clearly did not “fight” at all. Defendant Sheppard tells other officers that Plaintiff was disrespectful, confrontational, and cussed at Defendant Sheppard. None of those statements are true.

Upon the arrival of the ambulance to evaluate Plaintiff, Defendant gives the EMTs his version of events and informs them that Plaintiff is complaining of knee pain. The ambulance that was called to the scene was owned and operated by “Freeman Ambulance” (a registered fictitious name for Defendant Freeman-Oak Hill Health Systems).

One of the EMTs that arrived on scene was Defendants Roy Rivard. Defendant Rivard, at all relevant times, was acting as an employee and agent of Defendant Freeman-Oak Hill Health Systems, dba Freeman Ambulance. Defendant Freeman-Oak Hill Health Systems, dba Freeman Ambulance, is liable for the acts and omissions of its employee through the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Once on scene, Defendant Rivard negligently performed his duties as EMT. Defendant Rivard examined Plaintiff while she was seated in the back of a police SUV. Defendant Rivard can be heard on body cam footage stating that Plaintiff had “a little swelling, she’s got full range of motion, as far as I’m concerned, I don’t see…{shugs}. I still need a refusal from [an officer], I don’t care who signs it. She’s in custody and I guess wants to be an ignorant bitch.”

Despite this clear and immediate admission that Plaintiff’s knee had “a little swelling,” the medical record relating to the examination indicates that no swelling was observed. Defendant Rivard further commented that there was “no increased screaming anywhere I touched,” inadvertently acknowledging that Plaintiff was screaming in pain during his exam, which is also not recorded in the medical record prepared by Defendant Rivard.

The medical record prepared by Defendant Rivard also indicates that Plaintiff was able to bear weight on her left knee. A review of Defendant Sheppard’s body camera footage makes clear that Plaintiff could not bear weight on her left knee. A review of Defendant Sheppard’s body camera footage also makes it clear that medical personnel never removed Plaintiff from the back of the police car.

The medical record prepared by Defendant Rivard also indicates that Plaintiff refused medical treatment. Defendant Rivard obtains a signature attesting that Plaintiff refused medical care from Defendant Sheppard.

Defendant Sheppard’s body camera footage makes clear that he never witnessed Plaintiff refuse medical care. Plaintiff did not refuse medical care. Had Plaintiff refused medical care, Defendant Sheppard should have complied with McDonald County Sheriff’s Department policy 300.6, which states that “any refusal should be included in the recording” if a recording is made. No such recording was made because Plaintiff, in fact, was repeatedly requesting medical treatment.

Plaintiff was callously and recklessly denied medical care when she was clearly in need of it by both Defendants Rivard and Sheppard. Jail After Plaintiff was “cleared” to be taken to jail by Defendant Rivard, Defendant Sheppard transported her to the McDonald County Jail.

Upon arrival, Defendant Sheppard commands Plaintiff to exit his patrol vehicle under her own power and to walk approximate twenty-five feet to the entrance to the jail. Plaintiff again informs Defendant Sheppard that she cannot walk with her knee injury. Attempting to exit the vehicle with her own power causes Plaintiff to scream in pain.

Defendant Sheppard conveys to the jailer waiting to receive her that she had been “cleared by medical.” Defendant Sheppard also falsely conveys to the jailer that “medical” found “no swelling” despite having been specifically told there was at least some swelling to the knee.

Based on what he has been told by Sheppard, the jailor begins speaking harshly to Plaintiff and telling her that has had “seen better actresses and actors in B-movies. Get in there, sit down, quit your shit.”

Plaintiff is told “Get your ass in there on that bench. I am done playing. And so is he. Cut the bullshit and f---ing walk!”

Defendant Sheppard then suggests that he and the other officer charge her with a second “resisting” arrest because she is unable to walk on a broken leg as they are demanding she do. Defendant Sheppard next tells the jailer that, instead of merely processing her at the jail and releasing her with two summonses as he had previously planned, he wants the jailer to hold her in jail for a full twenty-four (24) hours, regardless of whether she is charged or not by the prosecutor because she “keeps fiddlefarting around.”

Throughout her stay at jail, she repeatedly told her jailers that her knee was broken. After receiving no treatment and being made to repeatedly walk on a broken leg, Plaintiff was released from jail after several hours.

Plaintiff’s daughter picks her up from jail and drives her to the nearest hospital. Plaintiff arrives at Mercy Hospital Northwest Arkansas at 1:46pm February 23, 2021. 90. At the hospital, x-rays and other diagnostic testing reveal comminuted fractures of her left tibial plateau (the bottom of her left knee).

Upon arriving, Plaintiff is noted as having “generalized swelling and palpable joint effusion” of her left knee. 92. Plaintiff later underwent surgery and physical therapy on her left knee. Subsequently, all charges filed against Plaintiff were dismissed.